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Abstract: 
The purpose of this article is to investigate the optimal merger policy in the presence of 
deterrence as well as type I and type II errors. We derive the optimal number of merger 
investigations, both when the competition authority commits to a particular activity level and 
when they do not commit. It is shown that no commitment can lead to a less active merger 
policy and lower welfare than what is the case if commitment. If commitment there will be a 
positive welfare effect of the merger investigations due to its deterrence effect, while the 
merger investigations as such might have a negative impact on welfare (enforcement effect). 
The results have important implications for how one should interpret the empirical studies of 
the effects of merger enforcement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Several competition authorities have had an active merger policy the last decade. It is natural 
to question whether such an active merger policy has been successful. There have been 
studies investigating whether competition authorities have made the right decision in merger 
investigations.
2
 Several jurisdictions have at their own initiative quantified the expected 
effects of their own merger investigations.
3
 Some of them have also initiated ex post studies 
of the actual effect of a merger ban or a decision to allow a merger.
4
 However, all 
commentators seem to agree that such studies might detect only a ‘tip of the iceberg’ when it 
comes to the overall impact of merger policy.
 5
 The reason is that an active merger 
investigation policy will probably deter some firms from merging, and those cases will not be 
easily observed and certainly not be present in those studies referred to above. This is 
acknowledged by, for example, US Department of Justice:
6
  
 
‘We have not attempted to value the deterrence effects (...) of our successful enforcement 
efforts. While we believe that these effects in most matters are very large, we are unable to 
approach measuring them’.  
 
Recent empirical studies have shown that the deterrence effect of merger policy is probably 
substantial.
7
 Unfortunately, to our knowledge the existing theoretical literature on merger 
                                                 
2
 An early study of the effect of merger investigations is Eckbo (1983). It applies an event study by analysing 
how the stock market value of non-merging firms is affected by a merger and a merger investigation. Duso, 
Neven and Röller (2007) and Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2007) undertake related studies, focusing on the 
merger investigation in the EU. Other studies apply simulation models to investigate the possible anti-
competitive effect with respect to price increases. For example, Postema, Goppelsroder and van Bergejik (2006) 
simulate the hypothetical price effects of 11 mergers that were banned or cleared with remedies in the 
Netherlands. See also Peters (2006), where it is shown that simulation models can make poor predictions of 
actual price increases following a merger. 
3
 In 1999 both FTC and DOJ in the US started publishing estimates of savings for the consumers following 
merger bans. More recently both OFT and Competition Commission in United Kingdom and NMa in the 
Netherlands have published similar kind of studies, see for example Office of Fair Trading (2005). In these 
studies they typically apply some rules of thumb, for example that a merger would have resulted in a 1 % price 
increase for one year. At OFT and NMa they have supplemented those rules of thumb estimates with some 
estimates from simulation models, see for example OFT (2007). 
4
 One example is the European Commission, who initiated a study of the effects of the ban of the merger 
between Pirelli and BICC in 2000 (see Lear, 2006). They did an event study, as well as a survey. OFT in the UK 
initiated a survey that detected the effects of permitting ten different mergers, see PwC Economics (2005). 
5
 The phrase ‘tip of an iceberg’ is a quote from Seldeslachts et al (2008). The important role of deterrence has 
been pointed out by many as something that is not taken into account, see for example Eckbo (1989), Davies and 
Majumar (2002), Joskow (2002), Crandall and Winston (2003) and Baker (2003). 
6
 See its congressional submission for the fiscal year 2001, quoted in Davies and Majumar (2002), p. 72. 
7
 See, for example, Seldeslachts et al (2008), Twynstra Gudde (2005) and Deloitte (2007). They are all referred 
to in Section 3. 
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policy rules out that merger control has any deterrence effect.
8
 The purpose of this article is to 
help fill this gap. According to our model deterrence as such has a decisive impact on the 
choice of an optimal merger policy, for example with respect to how many mergers that 
should be investigated and the welfare effect of merger enforcement as such. This illustrates 
that the merger policy recommendations as well as the predictions for empirical research 
drawn from the existing literature can be misguided. 
 
If each firm knows that there will be an active merger control, this implies that some firms 
might be deterred from merging. They decide not to merge, because they anticipate that the 
probability of a ban is large. It seems plausible to assume that firms are well informed about 
the impact of a merger, and that those firms with a large negative welfare effect of a merger 
are those that typically will be banned following an investigation. If there is such a bias, the 
actual mergers that are proposed by the parties will mainly consist of those with a positive 
welfare effect and those mergers where the welfare effect is highly uncertain or only have a 
modestly negative effect on welfare.  
 
In our basic model we assume that the competition authority commits to a particular activity 
level, which means that there is a certain probability for a proposed merger being 
investigated. If investigated, the competition authority receives a signal about the welfare 
effect of the proposed merger. Even though they take the signal into account in their final 
decision, they can make both type I and type II errors. When setting the activity level, the 
competition authority must make a tradeoff between deterrence and making mistakes in its 
final decision. On the one hand, an active merger policy will deter those mergers most 
detrimental to welfare. On the other hand, an active merger policy will imply that fewer 
mergers detrimental to welfare are proposed and thereby lead to a more limited scope for 
banning bad mergers. We show that with an optimal merger policy the merger investigations 
as such can have a detrimental effect on welfare (enforcement effect). The reason is that those 
                                                 
8
 Two exceptions are Katsoulacos and Ulph (2007, 2008). The deterrence effect is present in their model. 
However, their main focus is the choice between legal standards (a rule of reason versus a per se rule). There are 
also some studies of how the presence of merger control would affect which type of mergers is being proposed. 
This was first discussed in Stigler (1966), who argued that the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act in the US 
discouraged the proposal of horizontal mergers and encouraged the proposal of vertical and conglomerate 
mergers. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005a) discuss whether mergers on the same market can be substitutes for 
each other. Besanko and Spulber (1993) consider a case where firms have private information about cost savings 
following a merger, and they discuss how the choice of welfare standard will affect which mergers that will be 
proposed. The importance of the welfare standard is also discussed in Fridolfsson (2007) and Lyons (2003). In 
contrast to our study, none of the referred studies consider the overall impact of the deterrence effect and the 
enforcement effect of merger control. 
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mergers that are investigated are chosen among those that are not deterred. Since the mergers 
that have the largest anti-competitive effects are already deterred this leads to a large risk for 
type I errors (prohibiting welfare enhancing mergers). We show that it is optimal to commit to 
an activity level that leads to some mistakes when the final decision is made. The losses 
associated with the enforcement are then traded off against the gains associated with 
deterrence. 
 
If no commitment by the competition authority, we show that the merger policy can become 
less active and that the welfare will always be lower than what is the case with commitment. 
We extend our basic model by allowing the competition authority to update their beliefs after 
observing the number of mergers being proposed. It is assumed that they can find out whether 
the investigations in total are welfare improving or not by inspecting the number of mergers 
being proposed. Obviously, if very few mergers are proposed then they can infer that all of 
them must be beneficial for society. However, it turns out that they will also clear all mergers 
without any investigation even if they know that some of them are detrimental to welfare. 
This is done to avoid banning any mergers that are welfare improving. If no commitment, the 
merging parties can behave strategically. They can refrain from proposing a merger, in order 
not to trigger any investigations. Then there will be a multiplicity of equilibria, because each 
potential merger candidate would like to be among those that are proposed. We show that no 
commitment leads to lower welfare, because the merging parties can exploit the fact that they 
are able to influence the competition authority’s decision to investigate or not.  
 
It is an open question whether commitment is possible for the competition authority. 
Apparently, it is difficult not to take into account information they receive concerning the 
number of mergers being proposed. However, it is doubtful whether you can infer much 
information, if any at all, by just observing the number of mergers being proposed.
9
 More 
importantly, the institutional setting in most competition authorities can be interpreted as if 
there is a commitment to investigating some proposed mergers during a certain period. For 
example, in some countries they have a merger unit that is responsible for merger control. 
                                                 
9
 In most countries the number of proposed mergers is very large compared to the number of mergers being 
banned. For example, in the EU in the period 1990-2006 more than 3000 mergers have been notified and only 19 
of them have been banned (see Davies and Lyons, 2007). This indicates that it can be difficult to draw any 
inference about whether there are many mergers detrimental to welfare from simply observing the total number 
of notifications. However, we can learn something from a careful econometric study. See for example 
Seldeslacht et al. (2008), who use cross-country data with merger notifications to check whether it is any 
deterrence effect.  
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Moreover, the role of the competition authority is to carefully check whether there are some 
mergers detrimental to welfare and also to deter mergers. Such a goal is difficult to 
accomplish if they choose not to investigate any of the proposed mergers. In line with this it is 
plausible to assume that there is a commitment to an activity level. Our results show that such 
a commitment is not only plausible, but that it can also be optimal to organize merger control 
in such a way. 
 
Our results indicate that the competition authorities may find it difficult to determine whether 
it has succeeded in choosing an optimal merger policy. If, for example, empirical studies 
show that merger investigations as such are welfare enhancing this might imply under-
enforcement if they do have a commitment to an activity level. On the other hand, a large 
amount of both type I and Type II errors is neither a sign of an optimal merger policy. In any 
case, if the competition authorities have the impression that they are left with only difficult 
merger cases this should not be a surprise according to our analysis. It should apparently be in 
accordance with what we would expect if they have succeeded in deterring those mergers 
most detrimental to welfare by organizing their merger control in such a way that they commit 
to a certain activity level.  
 
To have a correct understanding of the overall impact of merger enforcement one should 
evaluate not only the direct effect from those mergers that were investigated (type I and type 
II errors), but in addition try to measure the number of mergers being deterred. Evidence of a 
large deterrence effect combined with rather ambiguous empirical results concerning the 
direct effect of merger enforcement might be a better sign of an optimal policy than evidence 
of a limited amount of deterrence and at the same time large direct gains from merger 
enforcement.  
 
In the next section we present our model, and solve for the optimal merger policy both with 
respect to the extent and the quality of the merger control. In Section 3 we offer some 
concluding remarks, and confront our theoretical results with empirical studies of the 
deterrence of mergers. 
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2. Merger policy 
 
2.1 The basic model 
Let us consider a population of Z potential mergers in an economy, where Z = X + Y. There 
are some potential mergers, denoted Y, which obviously will not cause any concern for 
competition authorities. Various screening devices will clear those mergers very early on, and 
we expect that all potential mergers Y are implemented since they will be cleared. First, there 
are some mergers that are not notified to the competition authorities because they are below 
the threshold levels. Second, some notified mergers do apparently not raise any competition 
concerns. For example, for mergers where firms are not even in related markets it is obvious 
that there will be no anti-competitive effects. The same is true if a merger takes place in an 
industry with low concentration.
10
 Those mergers are cleared very early on.
11
 In what follows 
we do not consider Y, but focus on the remaining population of potential mergers that is not 
cleared very early on. That is defined as X. 
 
Among the population of X potential mergers, some are welfare improving and others not. Let 
us define Wx as the welfare effect of merger x, defined as 
 
 xAWx            (1) 
 
If x = 0, it implies that this particular merger has a positive welfare effect equal to A, while x > 
A implies that the welfare effect of that particular merger is negative. If X is the total number 
of mergers, the aggregate welfare effect of all potential mergers is as follows: 
 
  


Xx
x
dxxAW
0
)(          (2) 
 
                                                 
10
 In most countries they have some threshold levels for concentration. For example, in the EU they refer to 
threshold levels, both with respect to Herfindahl-Hirschmann index and market shares, and state that it is 
unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns below such a concentration. See European Commission 
(2004), paragraphs 18-21. 
11
 In EU this can be interpreted as those mergers that are not cleared soon after notification, and some of them 
proceed to second phase investigation. Note that in the EU in the period 1990-2006 less than 5 % of the notified 
mergers proceed to phase II investigation. In Norway, where the threshold level for notification is low, less than 
5 % of the notified mergers submit a complete notification. This implies that more than 95 % of the notified 
mergers in Norway are cleared within 15 working days. 
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The aggregate welfare effect can be illustrated by Figure 1. The horizontal green lines 
illustrate the total welfare gain from all welfare improving mergers, while the vertical red 
lines illustrate the total welfare loss from all mergers that are detrimental to welfare. 
 
As a starting point, let us consider a setting with perfect information and no costs associated 
with merger control. In such an unrealistic situation the competition authorities is prepared to 
challenge all mergers where x > A.  This would lead to a situation where all mergers x < A is 
permitted and implemented, while all mergers where x > A are banned. The net welfare effect 
following mergers that are implemented would then be equal to the area marked by the 
horizontal green lines in Figure 1, while the welfare gain from blocking mergers detrimental 
to welfare is equal to the vertical red lines in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Potential mergers and welfare effects of them 
 
We all know that this is not a realistic description of merger control. In particular, it is 
obvious that there will be imperfect information.
12
 Although the competition authority knows 
that there are some good and some bad mergers, they do not know which one is good and 
                                                 
12
 Obviously, it is also wrong to assume that there are no costs associated with merger investigations. However, 
we will show that even by assuming no such costs there will be an optimum number of merger investigation. Our 
point is to illustrate that there are other forces than such costs that can limit the number of merger investigations. 
If we include costs associated with a merger investigation, this would obviously have a quantitative effect. 
However, it will not make any qualitative difference. 
Welfare 
effects 
Welfare loss 
 
0 
A 
Potential 
mergers x 
Welfare gain 
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which one is bad – at least early in the investigation.13   To understand the potential forces at 
work, let us make some simplifying assumptions concerning the uncertainty.  First, we 
assume that all mergers not cleared in the early phase have the same probability of being 
investigated in detail by the competition authority (uniform distribution). It is a plausible 
assumption, given that the competition authority has a large degree of uncertainty early in the 
merger investigation when all the obvious cases are already cleared.
14
  
 
Second, we assume that the competition authority in its final decision to a certain degree can 
distinguish between mergers that are welfare improving and those that are detrimental to 
welfare. This seems natural, since the competition authority is expected to learn from the 
investigation. In our model this is captured by assuming that the competition authority 
receives a signal about the welfare effect of the merger. They receive either a good or bad 
signal (a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’), and this signal is drawn from a distribution that is contingent on the 
actual welfare effect. The probability for receiving a good signal for merger x is as follows: 
 
 
X
xX
Px

           (3) 
 
We see that the larger the true welfare gain, the larger the probability of receiving a good 
signal.  
 
As can be seen from (3), we assume a linear relationship between the welfare effect of a 
merger and the probability of receiving a good signal. The best merger will receive a good 
signal with a probability of one, while the worst merger will receive a good signal with a 
probability of zero. 
 
                                                 
13
 We could have assumed that the competition authority could learn something from simply observing the 
number of mergers being proposed, and by doing so could revise its beliefs about the welfare effect of a 
particular merger. We will come back to that later on, when we assume that they can update their belief in such a 
way.  
14
 Duso, Neven and Röller (2007) investigated the quality of merger control in the EU. They find that the 
probability for waving an anti-competitive merger through is 75 % larger in phase I than in phase II 
investigation. This shows that the uncertainty is much larger in the early phase of the investigation than later on. 
We will later on discuss what might happen if we relax the assumption of uniform distribution, and allow for less 
uncertainty concerning the choice of mergers to investigate. 
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Furthermore, let us assume that the final decision is in accordance with the signal the 
competition authority receives.  The expected value of merger x is the welfare effect 
multiplied with the probability that it receives a good signal and then is cleared: 
 
 EWX = 



 

X
xX
xA )(         (4) 
 
2.2 The benchmark 
Let us assume that X = 2 and A = 1, which implies that we normalise the number of mergers 
to 2.
15
 In Figure 2 we have plotted the expected value of all mergers, taking into account the 
probability that a merger is cleared or not after investigation. 
 
Expected welfare effect, 
given merger investigations:
Welfare effect, if no merger 
investigation
0
1
Potential 
mergers
Type II errors
Type I errors





 

2
2
)1(
x
x
Increased welfare from 
banning mergers
 
 
Figure 2:  Welfare effects of mergers, given merger enforcement 
  
The dotted line in Figure 2 is the welfare effect of each merger, given that all potential 
mergers are implemented and none of them are banned. The solid curve is the expected 
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 This should not be taken literally. We could, for example, assumed that X = 2000, and at the same time A = 
1000, and our result would be the same. Then there would be 2000 potential mergers rather than 2.  In any case, 
there will be a continuum of mergers. 
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welfare effect of each merger, given that all of them are investigated and the final decision is 
in accordance with the signal the competition authority receives. 
 
The difference between the solid curve and the dotted line in Figure 2 is the welfare effect of 
investigating all mergers. We see that there is a large probability that mergers that could cause 
a large welfare loss is banned, shown with the large difference between the solid and the 
dotted curve for x approaching 2. This is the positive effect of having merger investigations, 
although not all mergers that are detrimental to welfare are banned. Hence, it still remains 
some type II errors: Mergers that are detrimental to welfare are permitted. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2 with the red (dark grey) area. On the other hand, merger investigation leads to some 
welfare improving mergers being banned. This is illustrated in Figure 3 with the difference 
between the solid and the dotted curves for x < 1. These are the type I errors, shown with the 
yellow (light grey) area in Figure 2. 
 
Note that the situation illustrated in Figure 2 can be seen as a benchmark. This is the case if 
no deterrence effect at all, and all potential mergers are actually proposed (even though some 
of them are not permitted). Let us consider the effect if only some of the mergers are proposed 
and not all. In particular, let us for the moment consider what happens if the worst mergers are 
banned. Let x
L
 denote the merger with the largest negative impact on welfare that is proposed. 
If all proposed mergers are investigated, that is all x ≤ xL are investigated, then the welfare 
effect of having a merger policy is as follows: 
 
 EW  =   dxxdx
x
x
LL xx
x
xx
x
)1(
2
2
)1(
00










 
       (5) 
 
This is the expected welfare when all proposed mergers are investigated, deducted the welfare 
if no merger investigation at all. Since we assume a uniform distribution if some but not all 
proposed mergers are investigated, we know that investigating only some mergers would lead 
to higher welfare if (5) is positive.  Then we have the following result: 
 
Lemma 1: If x
L
 mergers are proposed and all or some of x ≤ xL are investigated and the final 
decision is in accordance with the signal the competition authority receives, then merger 
investigation as such is detrimental to welfare if x
L
 < 1.5. 
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Proof: We can rewrite (5) as: 
Lx
x
x
xx
xEW
0
232
)
2
()
64
3
( 


  
Setting ∆EW = 0 and solving it, we have that ∆EW = 0 when xL = 1.5. This implies that ∆EW 
< 0 when x
L
 < 1.5. Q.E.D. 
 
In Figure 3 we have shown the welfare effect of investigating all proposed mergers, given that 
only x mergers are proposed and those mergers not proposed are those that are most 
detrimental to welfare. 
 
Figure 3: Welfare effect of merger investigations, given that x mergers are proposed 
 
We see that when some of the worst mergers are not proposed, then the welfare effect of 
merger investigation becomes lower. This is natural, since we no longer can ban those worst 
mergers. For x
L
 < 1.5, the merger investigation is detrimental to welfare. Then one is left with 
mergers that are welfare enhancing and only modestly detrimental to welfare, and for those 
mergers there is a large risk of both type I and type II errors. We will later on explain how 
those worst mergers can be deterred in optimum. 
 
EW 
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2.3 Merger control and the merger decision 
Given that there is an institution that is responsible for competition policy, it is difficult to see 
how this institution can have the flexibility to change the merger control activity quite 
dramatically from one year to another. It would be of interest for such an institution to build a 
reputation. For example, by committing to a specific activity level it might succeed in 
deterring some mergers detrimental to welfare. One way to commit to a merger control policy 
would be to devote resources to merger control. As described above, we assume that the 
competition authority commits to a certain activity level towards each proposed merger. It 
determines the probability for a merger (that has not been cleared early on) to be investigated 
in detail. We let N denote probability for a proposed merger being investigated. This means 
that the probability for being investigated does not depend on the total number of mergers that 
are proposed.
16
 The competition authority then determines each merger’s probability for being 
investigated by choosing N. If N = 1, then all proposed mergers are investigated. 
 
We assume the following sequence of moves: 
 
Stage 1: Competition authority sets N 
Stage 2: The firms decide to merge or not 
Stage 3: Competition authority determines which of the proposed mergers that will be 
investigated 
Stage 4: Competition authority receives a signal concerning the welfare effect of each 
of the investigated mergers 
Stage 5: For each merger investigated, competition authority either clears or prohibits 
the merger 
 
It seems plausible to assume that the firms know more about the effect of the merger than the 
competition authorities, or at least has the same knowledge about the welfare effect of a 
merger as the competition authority when the final decision is made by the competition 
authority. In line with this, we assume that the firms considering to merge anticipate the 
welfare effect of their own merger and the expected decision that will be made by the 
competition authority. 
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 Later on we relax this assumption, see Section 2.6. 
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Let us assume that the net present value associated with the merger is π, and that the costs 
associated with implementing the merger are equal to C. The latter is a sunk cost that is 
incurred following the decision to merge, irrespective of whether the merger is allowed or not. 
We assume that π and C are identical for all mergers.17  
 
It is profitable for firm x to undertake a merger if: 
 
0)1(
2
2








 CN
x
NM x  ,     (6) 
 
The second term inside the bracket shows the probability for not being investigated. If so, the 
merger will be permitted. The first term inside the bracket shows the probability of being 
investigated, multiplied with the probability of being cleared if investigated. Both terms are 
multiplied with the net present value, so that we have the expected net present value. The 
merger candidates find it profitable to merge if the expected net present value exceeds the 
sunk costs associated with merging. 
 
Rearranging, we have that a merger will take place if: 
 
*)(2 x
N
C
x 




        (7) 
 
π > C is a necessary condition for a merger being profitable, and therefore for a merger being 
proposed. If C > 0, we see that some firms are deterred from merging. They anticipate that the 
probability of clearance is quite low. Given that, for some firms it is no longer profitable to 
incur a cost C when merging. 
 
From (7) we can derive how a more active merger enforcement policy will influence the 
numbers of mergers that is proposed:  
 
                                                 
17
 This implies that the costs associated with a merger process and the profits from a merger are identical for all 
firms. Clearly, some mergers are more profitable than others. If mergers that are detrimental to welfare had on 
average been more profitable, that would make our assumption unrealistic. We will later on discuss this 
assumption. 
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

2
* )(2
N
C
N
x 



        (8) 
 
We see that 0/*  Nx , which implies that the total number of mergers that are actually 
proposed is lower the larger the probability of being investigated. This is plausible, since 
more mergers investigated would imply that the probability of a merger ban for a particular 
merger is increased. Moreover, we see that the lower C and the larger π the larger impact on 
x
*
 will an increase in N have. 
 
2.4 The extent of the merger control 
To determine how many mergers that should be investigated, the competition authority has to 
consider a trade off. On the one hand, a higher probability for being investigated would have a 
deterrence effect. This is beneficial, as long as the deterred merger is detrimental to welfare. 
On the other hand, one more merger investigation might lead to a merger being banned that 
should not be banned (enforcement effect). 
 
As explained above, the competition authority commits to a probability for investigating each 
proposed merger by choosing N. The optimal N is determined by the following general 
condition: 
 

0
1*
*
1*
*
5.1*








   

xif
xifxif
N
x
dx
dEW
N
EW     (9) 
 
The first term is the direct effect of merger enforcement. It is the expected welfare effect of 
the particular merger investigation as such. The last term, consisting of two products, is the 
deterrence effect. We know from (8) that the last product in the last term is always negative. 
Moreover, we know from (1) that for x
*
 > 1, the welfare effect of a deterred merger is positive 
so that */ dxdEW  is negative. Then we know that for x
*
 > 1 we have that one more merger 
investigation has a deterrence effect that is welfare enhancing. Furthermore, we know from 
Lemma 1 that as long as x
*
 > 1.5, then merger investigation as such (the enforcement effect) 
has a positive effect. This implies that x
*
 > 1.5 cannot be an optimum unless we have a corner 
solution, because then both the enforcement effect and the deterrence effect of one more 
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merger investigation is positive. On the other hand, x
*
 < 1 can neither be an optimum unless 
mergers are not profitable. The reason is that in such a case both the deterrence and the 
enforcement effect are negative. A marginal reduction in the number of merger investigations 
must be welfare enhancing. Then we know that in optimum we have that 1 < x
*
 < 1.5 unless 
we have a corner solution.  
 
Given that 1 < x
*
 < 1.5 and we have an interior solution, the deterrence effect is positive and 
the enforcement effect is negative. Consequently, in optimum the welfare effect of the last 
merger investigation is negative. Since we assume a uniform distribution concerning which 
mergers are investigated, this means that on average the welfare effect of merger investigation 
as such (the enforcement effect) is negative.  
  
Not all mergers detrimental to welfare are deterred in optimum. In that respect it is a surprise 
that it is not welfare improving to investigate more mergers. The driving force, however, is 
the systematic bias in the mergers that are proposed. When the worst mergers are deterred, the 
remaining ones are those that are welfare enhancing and those that are modestly detrimental 
to welfare. By choosing which one to investigate among them, it is a large risk of both type I 
and type II errors. Although one is fully aware of this fact when deciding on how many 
mergers to investigate, in optimum the merger investigations as such (enforcement effect) are 
detrimental to welfare.  
 
We can solve explicitly for the optimal merger investigation. Since we have a uniform 
distribution of mergers that are investigated, to check for the effect of the enforcement effect 
of the merger investigation we can look at the average effect of an increase in N among all 
those mergers that are proposed. Then the total expected welfare effect for all proposed 
mergers divided by x
*
 is the enforcement effect of a marginal change in N.  
 
Concerning the deterrence effect, we know that the merger that is deterred on the margin is x
*
, 
which has (1 - x
*
) as the welfare effect. In addition, we must take into account how a merger 
investigation affects the deterrence. We then have that optimum deterrence is determined by 
the following condition  
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When we replace x
*
 with the expression in (7) and Nx  /*  from (8), we can solve with 
respect to N. We know that at most all proposed mergers will be investigated (N = 1 at 
maximum). Then we have that:  
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If N
*
 < 1, then we have an interior solution (probability lower than one for each proposed 
merger being investigated). If so, we can replace N in (7) with N
*
 from the right term 
expression in (11), and we can find the optimal number of mergers that are not deterred. 
Otherwise, we set N = 1 in (7). The optimum x is then as follows: 
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We can now summarise our results: 
 
Proposition 1: If N
*
 < 1, we have that 1 < x
*
 < 1.5, and some but not all potential mergers 
detrimental to welfare are deterred. The deterrence effect is positive, while the enforcement 
effect as such is on average negative. If N
*
 = 1, then all proposed mergers are investigated, 
and x
*
 = 2(π - C)/π. 
 
In Figure 4 we have reported a numerical example. It is assumed that C = 0.1. The solid black 
curves denotes x
*
 while the dotted black curve denotes N
*
 for different values of π. For π < 
0.35, not all proposed mergers are investigated and we have an interior solution (N
*
 < 1). For 
π  0.35 all proposed mergers are investigated (N* = 1). We see that for π < 0.35 an increase 
in profits has a smaller impact on the optimal number of proposed mergers than what is the 
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case for π > 0.35. The reason is that the impact of an increase in π is partly offset by an 
increase in N. The offsetting effect is no longer present when π is sufficiently large, because 
then there is no scope for a further increase in the number of mergers investigated.  
 
 
Figure 4: A numerical example, given that C = 0.1 
 
We have assumed that all mergers have the same profitability. Obviously, some mergers are 
more profitable than others. If the profitability varies, then there is no longer a one-to-one 
relationship between mergers being deterred and the mergers that are detrimental to welfare. 
For example, a merger that has a large negative impact on welfare might be proposed because 
there are prospects for large profits following a clearance for this particular merger.  
 
In principle, large variation in profits between potential mergers might destroy the deterrence 
effect. Those deterred mergers are the unprofitable ones rather than the ones with a negative 
impact on welfare. Note, however, that we still assume that mergers that are detrimental to 
welfare have a higher probability for being banned than welfare enhancing mergers. 
Moreover, if mergers typically lead to synergies then we expect a positive correlation between 
welfare and profits, which also tends to prevent the mergers with a positive impact on welfare 
from being deterred. As the long as the variation in profits is sufficiently small, we would 
observe that not all but most of the deterred mergers are typical mergers that are detrimental 
to welfare. If this is true, the expected deterrence effect of a merger is still positive as long as 
not too many mergers are deterred. This is analogous to the mechanism in our basic model. In 
optimum the last merger deterred is then expected to be a merger detrimental to welfare. 
π 
N * 
x* 
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Given that, the enforcement as such has on average a negative impact on welfare. Proposition 
1 will then hold, as long as the variation in profits is not too large and the quality of the 
merger control is sufficiently high (see next point). 
 
2.5 The quality of the merger control 
If the quality of the merger control is sufficiently high, the deterred mergers are expected to 
be on average those with a negative impact on welfare even if we observe variation in profits. 
Let us now introduce a parameter β, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. This parameter can be a proxy for the 
quality of the final decision. We now define the expected welfare effect of merger x following 
a merger investigation as follows: 
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Until now we have assumed that β = 1. If β < 1, there will be more type I and type II errors. In 
fact, if β = 0 the final decision is a random choice where all investigated mergers will have a 
probability of ½ for being banned. More type I and type II errors implies that the enforcement 
costs of merger investigations are higher, and according to this effect fewer mergers should be 
investigated. 
 
On the other hand, we must also check how a reduction in β will influence the merger 
candidates’ incentives to propose a merger. To do that, let us also introduce the possibility of 
a relationship between the welfare effect and the profitability. We take into account that 
mergers detrimental to welfare can be more or less profitable than mergers that enhance 
welfare. The parameter α captures this relationship. If  α = 0, then there is no relationship 
between the profitability and the welfare effect of a merger. If α < 0, then mergers with the 
highest profitability are the ones with the largest improvement in welfare.  If α > 0, the 
opposite is true and the welfare effect is decreasing in the profitability of a merger. A merger 
is now profitable if: 
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For the moment, let us assume that α = 0 (as in the previous discussion). It can then easily be 
seen that a reduction in β will make it more profitable to merge for all mergers x > 1. The 
reason is that a less precise final decision by the competition authorities is beneficial for all 
merger candidates that have more than 50 % probability of being banned. Those merger 
candidates with a merger that is expected to be detrimental to welfare do have larger 
probability than ½ for being banned, and a less precise final decision would make it more 
likely for them to be cleared.  
 
We now see that a less accurate final decision will lead to a higher cost of enforcement and 
higher incentives for the firms with mergers that are detrimental to welfare to propose a 
merger. This implies that a reduction in β will result in fewer mergers being deterred, i.e., a 
higher x
*
. Our main result will not change, since the enforcement as such still has a negative 
impact on welfare in optimum. In fact, the average cost associated with merger investigations 
as such is now higher than what is the case with a more correct outcome of the merger 
investigation. We see that the quality of the merger investigation is not only about type I and 
type II errors, but also about deterrence since a more accurate final decision leads to more 
deterrence.
18
 
 
If α < 0, there is a positive correlation between profitability and welfare. For example, this can 
be true if there are cost synergies that both the firm and the society benefits from. In such a 
case our results still holds, since both the probability of being banned and the profits tends to 
favour mergers with a positive impact on welfare. 
 
However, α > 0 can change our results quite dramatically. It can easily be seen from (14) that 
if α is sufficiently high there will no longer be any deterrence of the mergers with the largest 
negative impact on welfare. The reason is that those anticompetitive mergers are by definition 
the most profitable mergers, so they propose a merger even if there is a probability that they 
can be banned. For a given α, though, the quality of the merger investigation is crucial for the 
deterrence effect. As shown above, a higher β (more precise final decision) will make it more 
profitable to merge for those mergers that are welfare enhancing and less profitable to merge 
for those mergers detrimental to welfare. Moreover, a higher β has the largest impact on the 
worst mergers seen from a welfare perspective (and on the best mergers). If the negative 
                                                 
18
 As shown in Schinkel and Tuninstra (2006), active enforcement may actually make anticompetitive behavior 
more likely if enforcement agencies commit mistakes. 
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relationship between profits and welfare is sufficiently weak (sufficiently low α), then 
deterrence of the mergers most detrimental to welfare is still possible if we have a sufficiently 
high quality on the merger investigations.  
 
It is an empirical question whether there is a (negative) relationship between welfare and 
profits. A merger to monopoly is expected to lead to higher prices and higher profits. In that 
respect the merger most detrimental to welfare can be among the most profitable mergers. 
However, the probability for a merger to monopoly to be banned is quite high. In our model, 
if β = 1 and the merger to monopoly is the worst one seen from society’s perspective it is 
banned with certainty. This might imply that the marginal merger being deterred is not a 
merger to monopoly, and certainly not if the quality of the final decision of the competition 
authorities is sufficiently high. Concerning merger to oligopoly, it is not obvious that there is 
a strong negative relationship between welfare and profits for the merging firms even if it is 
clear that a merger leads to higher prices. For example, a merger with no cost effects and a 
reduction from three to two firms can lead to substantial higher prices but lower profits for the 
merging parties.
19
 This illustrates that the mergers with the largest price increases are not 
necessarily the ones with the largest increase in profits for the merging parties. Results from 
empirical studies are mixed, where some of them find that mergers are motivated by cost 
reductions while others find that they are motivated by market power.
20
 If cost synergies are 
present, then we expect a positive relationship between profits and welfare since synergies are 
typically beneficial both for firms and for the society. This raises questions about whether 
there in fact is a negative relationship between profits and welfare. But even if there is such a 
relationship, the mergers most detrimental to welfare are the ones that are deterred if the 
competition authorities’ final decision is of sufficiently high quality.  
 
Proposition 2: If the relationship between profits and welfare () is positive or modestly 
negative, then a sufficiently high quality of the merger control (high ) will ensure that anti-
                                                 
19
 This was first shown in Salant et al (1983), where they applied a setting with Cournot competition and 
identical firms. The basic mechanism is that the non-merging parties can free ride on the output reduction of the 
merging firms, and thereby can the non-merging firms increase both sales and prices. If we apply a model with 
Bertrand instead of Cournot competition, a merger with no cost savings will always increase profits. However, 
also in that case the non-merging firms are better off following the merger than the merging firms. 
20
 For recent surveys of the empirical literature, see Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005b) and Kokkoris (2007). Note, 
though, that these studies are mainly concerned about distinguishing between market power and cost reductions 
as a motive for merging. Even if they conclude that market power is the motive, they have not proven that 
mergers with a large negative impact on welfare are more profitable. 
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competitive mergers are deterred. A higher quality of merger control (higher ) leads to more 
deterrence.  
 
The quality of the merger decisions made by the competition authority also depends on the 
choice of mergers being investigated. Until now we have assumed that the choice of mergers 
being investigated is uniform distributed. What if the selection process is less random, so that 
it is influenced by whether a merger is welfare improving or not? First, we know from the 
discussion concerning (9) that the marginal effect of merger investigations (enforcement 
effect) must in any case be negative. The question is whether the enforcement effect can be 
negative on average for other cases than uniform distribution of which mergers are 
investigated. If the decision concerning which mergers are investigated is influenced by the 
welfare effect and not chosen randomly, this would lead to a lower risk for type I errors 
(banning a merger that is not anti-competitive). If so, we expect more mergers to be 
investigated and then a larger fraction of the anti-competitive mergers being deterred. But 
even then we might end up with merger enforcement as such being detrimental to welfare. For 
example, think about a situation where the choice of which mergers to investigate is close to 
being perfect. Then close to all mergers that are detrimental to welfare are deterred, and the 
observed mergers being proposed consists of almost only mergers that are welfare enhancing. 
This leads to very few, but at least one, type I error. The actual effect of merger enforcement 
is then on average expected to be negative. 
 
2.6 No commitment 
Let us now relax the assumption that there is a commitment to a merger investigation activity 
at stage 1. We let the competition authority observe the number of mergers being proposed 
before they decide how many of those mergers that will be investigated. They can then update 
their beliefs about the welfare effect of investigating a merger. Moreover, let us assume that 
they can observe which mergers are proposed but not the identity for each of them. 
 
For the moment, let us assume that the proposed mergers are those with the lowest negative 
impact on welfare. If this is the case, the competition authority would know that a banned 
merger will on average be detrimental to welfare as long as x
L
 < 1.5 (see Lemma 1). This is 
true even when the competition authority takes into consideration the signal when the final 
decision is made. It means that as long as x
L
 ≤ 1.5, no mergers should be investigated. If 2 ≥ 
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x
L
 > 1.5, the competition authority knows that investigating a merger would on average 
improve welfare. In that case all mergers should be investigated. 
 
Proposition 3: If no commitment and the mergers with the largest negative impact on welfare 
are those that are not proposed, then no mergers will be investigated if x
L ≤ 1.5, and if more 
mergers are proposed all of them will be investigated. The number of proposed mergers are 
x** = max {1.5, min{2(π – C)/π,2}}. 
 
Given no commitment by the competition authority, the firms considering to merge can 
influence the decision to investigate. If the profitability to merge is sufficiently high, they will 
decide to merge even if they know that it will trigger an investigation of all proposed mergers. 
Otherwise, the equilibrium outcome implies that so few firms merge that the competition 
authority decides not to investigate any proposed mergers. Strategic behaviour by the merging 
parties will then result in no investigation taking place in equilibrium. This is an equilibrium, 
because one more additional merger would trigger an investigation of all mergers. If so, this 
additional merger is not profitable. 
 
The effect of no commitment in this case is illustrated in Figure 5, which is the same 
numerical example as in Figure 4. We assume that C = 0.1. The left hand figure is from 
Figure 4. The right hand figure is the optimal amount of proposed mergers and the optimal 
activity level if no commitment for the case where the proposed mergers are the best mergers 
for society. We see that the optimal number of proposed mergers is higher if no commitment 
as long as π < 2/5. For higher values of π, all proposed mergers are investigated irrespective 
of whether there is no commitment or a commitment. 
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Figure 5: A numerical example, given that C = 0.1, for commitment and no commitment 
 
So far we have derived the equilibrium outcome given that the mergers with the largest 
negative impact on welfare are the ones not proposed. However, there might be other 
equilibria as well. The reason is that the merging parties now can act strategically, since their 
decision can affect whether any investigation are undertaken or not. Each merger candidate 
would like to be one of the proposed mergers, given that the total number of proposed 
mergers is so low that the competition authority decides not to investigate any mergers.  
 
Note that there will always be some mergers that will be proposed in any case, and that 
consists of all mergers including x = 2(π – C)/π. These are the mergers that are profitable even 
if all proposed mergers are investigated.  As shown in the case in Figure 5, with low π there is 
scope for some additional proposed mergers without triggering any investigations. Those 
additional proposed mergers can be chosen among all remaining potential mergers. If some of 
the worst mergers seen from society is proposed and the competition authority knows which 
mergers are proposed, but not the identity of each of them, it would imply that an 
investigation is triggered at an earlier total number of mergers. The next potential merger that 
can be proposed will refrain from doing so, because he knows that it would have triggered an 
investigation of all mergers including this particular merger.
21
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 Note that since there is a multiplicity of equilibria in pure strategies, there will also be an equilibrium in mixed 
strategies.  
π 
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COMMITMENT NO COMMITMENT 
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The merging parties can behave strategically, and they do so by proposing such a limited  
number of mergers so that any investigation – whether all or only some mergers are 
investigated – will not increase welfare. Then it can be shown that we have the following 
result 
 
Proposition 4: If 2(π – C)/π ≥ 1.5, merger policy is not affected by whether there is a 
commitment or not. Otherwise, we have that with no commitment merger policy leads to a 
less active merger policy and lower welfare compared to a regime with commitment. 
 
Proof: If commitment and x* > 2(π – C)/π, 0/ dNdEW in optimum. For lower values of N, 
0/ dNdEW . Hence, ∆EW > 0 with commitment. If no commitment, either N = 0 or N = 1. 
For all x > 2(π – C)/π, Mx  < 0 if N = 1. Then N = 1 cannot be an equilibrium for x > 2(π – 
C)/π. If the number of proposed mergers are such that ∆EW ≤ 0, then N = 0. Obviously, in 
equilibrium then the number of proposed mergers are such that ∆EW = 0. Hence, welfare is 
higher with commitment. 
Consider whether there are any investigations in the no commitment regime. If x* > 2(π – 
C)/π, there are some of the proposed mergers in the commitment regime where Mx < 0 if N = 
1. Hence, N = 1 cannot be an equilibrium with no commitment. If x* > 2(π – C)/π, we would 
then have N = 0 with no commitment and 0 < N < 1 if commitment. If x* ≤ 2(π – C)/π, N = 1 
in both regimes. Q.E.D. 
 
It implies that a situation where the competition authority updates their beliefs after observing 
the number of mergers is detrimental to welfare. This is rather paradoxical. But the driving 
force is that the competition authority would prefer not to make too many type I errors and 
that the merging parties can exploit this fact. They propose mergers until an additional merger 
would have triggered an investigation of all proposed mergers, thereby encouraging the 
competition authority to have no merger investigations. This will lead to a less active merger 
policy, as illustrated in the example in Figure. In other cases it can in addition lead to an 
inefficient deterrence of mergers. Those mergers most detrimental to welfare can be among 
those proposed mergers, in contrast to what would happen if the competition authority had a 
commitment to an activity level. 
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3. Some concluding remarks 
 
An important lesson from our model is that deterrence matters for the choice of an optimal 
merger policy. If deterrence is present, it would have an impact on how active - or more 
precisely how restrictive - merger investigation policy should be. For example, we show that 
it is wrong to think that the deterrence effect is something that comes in addition to the 
enforcement effect. If the deterrence effect is present, the enforcement effect should be 
negative on average in optimum. This is true if the competition authority commits to a certain 
activity level. Commitment would lead to a more active and a better merger policy even if 
some mergers that are beneficial to welfare are banned (type I errors). Moreover, the quality 
of the merger investigation is crucial not only for the amount of type I and type II errors, but 
also for how many and which mergers that are deterred. 
 
One implication of our results is that it matters how the competition authority is organized. If 
no commitment, we find that merger control can be less active and lead to lower total welfare. 
A commitment to an active merger control could be implemented by instructing the 
enforcement agency – which typically is the competition authority – to have a particular 
activity level concerning investigating proposed mergers. One way to do this could be to 
establishing separate merger units within the competition authority, to ensure that resources 
are not devoted to other activities within the competition authority.
22
 In any case, it might not 
be that difficult to solve such a commitment problem since competition authorities should be 
concerned about the deterrence effect and would prefer to build a reputation for having a 
rather active policy. 
 
Our results illustrates that it is important to have information about whether any potential 
mergers are deterred, and whether those mergers most detrimental to welfare are the ones that 
are deterred. A recent study, covering 28 different jurisdictions, finds that an increase in the 
ban on mergers does have a negative impact on the number of mergers that is notified.
23
 This 
is consistent with merger policy having a deterrence effect. Another study did find some 
                                                 
22
 This is analogous to the time inconsistency problem discussed in Besanko and Spulber (1993). They have 
shown that it can be optimal for the legislator to impose a consumer welfare standard on an agency, because that 
would lead to decisions being more in line with an overall total welfare standard.  See also Farrell and Katz 
(2006), where the commitment problem is discussed. 
23
 See Seldeslachts et al. (2008), in which both the effects of a ban and imposing remedies is investigated. The 
employ a cross-jurisdictional data set for merger policies over the period 1992-2003. 
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support for a change in merger policy in the US towards a more active merger control led to 
deterrence of more anti-competitive mergers.
24
 On the other hand, a study did not find any 
tendency of more anti-competitive mergers in Canada than in the US in the period 1961-82 
despite the fact that Canada did not have any antitrust agency prior to 1985.
25
 
 
There is also evidence from surveys suggesting that the deterrence effect can be present.
26
 
NMa in the Netherlands initiated a survey where individuals working in competition law and 
consultancy firms were asked about possible cases where merger plans were dropped due to 
the anticipation of an active merger control.
27
 They did find support for mergers being 
deterred by the merging parties due to the anticipated problems associated with acceptance by 
the NMa. In sectors with very high concentration, undertakings do not invest energy in ideas 
for mergers. This indicates not only deterrence as such, but also that those mergers that are 
deterred are those with the largest negative impact on welfare. Of the ideas that reach lawyers 
– approximately 400 each year – almost half is abandoned almost immediately and according 
to the study the anticipation of merger control may play a role.  A recent study from United 
Kingdom used a similar kind of survey.
28
 It was found that for every merger that is blocked or 
modified following an intervention by the UK competition authorities, there are at least five 
mergers that are either abandoned or modified on competition grounds. This implies that for 
every merger ban there are at least five mergers that are deterred or modified. In line with this, 
they also found that the deterrence effect is more prevalent in those sectors where it has 
recently been a Competition Commission inquiry. 
 
These studies of the existence of deterrence indicate that what we observe is indeed a ‘tip of 
the iceberg’. Given these indications of deterrence of a rather large magnitude, it is of interest 
to look at the figures for merger control for the EU. 20 mergers have been prohibited since 
1990, which is on average slightly more than one merger ban each year in EU since 1990. 
This is on average less than 0.6 % of the number of notified mergers in the same period. More 
                                                 
24
 See Eckbo and Wier (1985), using an event study to analyse the effect of the US Hart-Scott-Rodino reform. 
25
 See Eckbo (1992). 
26
 For earlier surveys of possible deterrence effects of antitrust, see Beckenstein and Gabel (1983) concerning the 
US and a similar survey in Feinberg (1985) concerning Europe. See also Audretsch (1983), which is quoted in 
Kouliavtsev (2004). It is found that an average merger case brought by the Justice Department or FTC in the US 
deters between 11 and 16 other mergers. 
27
 See Twynstra Gudde (2005). See also NMa (2005), section 13.1, where some of the results are reported. 
28
 See Deloitte (2007), a report that was initiated by OFT. 
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interestingly, the number of mergers being banned every year has gone down in recent years. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5, where the accumulated number of banned mergers is reported.
29
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Figure 5:  Accumulated number of merger prohibitions in EU 1990-2006  
 
After 2001, only two mergers have been banned in EU. Does the slowdown in the growth in 
the accumulated number of prohibited mergers in recent years indicate that the deterrence 
effect is present and has become more prevalent in recent years? It is also of interest to note 
that the number of withdrawn mergers during the merger process has fallen in the EU. This 
might indicate that merging parties are becoming better to anticipate the outcome of the 
merging investigation in the EU, which implies that more mergers that is expected not to be 
cleared are not proposed.
30
 
 
The presence of a deterrence effect is also important for understanding the impact of the 
actual merger enforcement. In our model we find that on average merger investigations are 
detrimental to welfare, and they are undertaken simply because they deter anti-competitive 
mergers. In such a perspective one should be careful with the interpretation of the impact of 
actual merger control. If one finds a large positive impact, as for example in the study by 
                                                 
29
 The data are reported at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf. 
30
 See Davies and Lyons (2007), Table 1.1., where they compare the number of withdrawals in the EU for 
different time periods since 1990. 
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OFT, how can we explain that?
31
 One interpretation could be that we have underenforcement. 
Could it be that merger policy then should be more active, to deter more firms from merging 
and thereby achieve the optimum merger policy? Another interpretation could be that one so 
far has not reached the optimum, so merger candidates will in the future learn and be deterred 
to a larger degree than today. But if this is true, measuring the effects of merger enforcement 
as such over time will then in the future wrongly conclude that merger control has become 
less successful.  
 
                                                 
31
 In OFT (2007) they report the outcome of merger simulations, and conclude that ‘during the past three 
financial years OFT merger control has saved, on average, £ 52M each year’ (see paragraph 4.38). In 
comparison, for the financial year 2006-07 OFT spent £ 4M on merger control (see Table 8). 
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